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Abstract
This paper considers the joint role of macro-economic and bank-
speciﬁc factors in explaining the occurrence of banking problems in the
twenty-one Central and East European emerging markets over the recent
decade. Using data at the individual bank level we show, using a logit
model, that the macroeconomic factors play a central role in determining
banking sector instability in the early stages of difﬁculty, while the bank-
speciﬁc factors are more important in the later stages and gain more
weight as the banking sector develops and the institutional framework
becomes mature.
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21. Introduction
Most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have experi-
enced severe banking crises over the 1990s. These economies have been vul-
nerable to external shocks coupled with ﬁnancial liberalisation and economic
restructuring. The purpose of our research is to establish whether these crises
are primarily a function of the unique difﬁculties of transition or whether they
reﬂect similar factors to those recorded in the lead up to ﬁnancial crises else-
where around the globe. Most of the existing research on the factors that help
explain the occurrence of these problems deals with Asian or South American
banking crises. Moreover, some extensive cross-country studies, Hardy and
Pazarbasioglu (1998), for example, deliberately refrain from including Central
and Eastern European transition countries because they feel that these former
socialist transition economies suffered a special range of problems that make
them non-comparable with most of the other countries.
It is normally argued that the CEECs have faced twin problems. They have
started from state banks dominated by directed lending. Such banks have had
to switch to a risk based approach and acquire the expertise necessary to run
such a system successfully in a competitive environment. At the same time,
the opening up of the economy to market forces tends to render many of the
previous enterprises uncompetitive in their present activities. This results in a
major contraction in the economy and the revelation of a substantial stock of
non-performing loans.
The authorities are similarly unprepared for this environment, both in be-
ing able to prepare banks for the rigours of the new regime or in detecting
problems and assisting in their solution. Major ﬁscal pressures from declining
revenues and increased unemployment compound the difﬁculty and inhibit re-
capitalisation. If this were not enough there has normally been a bout of high
inﬂation as the whole structure of prices tries to adjust in a period of shortage.
In many cases this results in a two-stage problem. In the ﬁrst instance the
banks are overwhelmed by the scale of the macroeconomic pressures on the
whole range of their customers. In the second, their fragility, lack of experi-
ence and the pressure for success among a substantial number of new entrants
leads to further problems, exacerbated by any external shocks.
In this paper we seek to explore how the experience of banks across the
CEECs conforms to this pattern. We would anticipate that initially economy-
wide problems will dominate as the cause of distress, while later the difﬁcul-
ties will become more bank and regime-speciﬁc and hence more reminiscent
of the experience in other countries. After the second shake out it appears that
many of the CEECs have banking and regulatory structures similar to those of
3their Western European counterparts, assisted by considerable foreign owner-
ship by Western European banks.
2. Framework for Addressing the Problem
It is inevitable that comparative studies of emerging markets should be
dominated by concerns over the data. As a result, such cross-country stud-
ies tend to focus more on macroeconomic data than on other factors, as they
are more readily available and prima facie compatible. In these papers, GDP
growth, inﬂation, exchange rate movements and the terms of trade serve as the
warning signals of banking crises, as they all indicate sources of pressure on
bank income ﬂows and balance sheets. These broad-based macro-indicators
can sometimes be complemented with a set of aggregate banking sector vari-
ables such as credit to the private sector, deposits and banking sector foreign
reserves. Detailed differences aside, the general conclusions of macro-data
driven studies are consistent and intuitive. In brief the results reafﬁrm that
a deteriorating macroeconomic situation and underlying instabilities precip-
itate banking crises. These results have much in common with the ﬁndings
for OECD countries, as is illustrated in Mayes et al. (2001) for the Nordic
countries.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) focus on a further potential trig-
ger of ﬁnancial fragility that is relevant for our study, namely, ﬁnancial lib-
eralisation. Although ﬁnancial liberalisation as it is traditionally viewed –
removal of interest rate controls in their case – is a more minor shift than the
transition economies faced, it is nevertheless a regime change and hence in-
structive. Their results indicate that ﬁnancial liberalisation exerts a negative
effect on the stability of the ﬁnancial sector that is additional to those from
adverse macroeconomic developments and related vulnerabilities to balance-
of-payments crises. A strong institutional environment can, however, alleviate
the adverse impact of liberalization on the ﬁnancial system (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Detragiache, 1998). Unfortunately the study does not include the Euro-
pean emerging markets.
Notwithstanding the valuable insights from previous studies there is little
evidence on how authorities, such as central banks and supervisory agencies,
could make use of ﬁnancial fragility indicators in order to safeguard the sta-
bility of the banking system as a whole. Similar problems exist in ﬁnding
clear evidence on why some banks survive the adverse macroeconomic con-
ditions and external shocks whereas the others fail. There are several studies
mainly based on US and a few Latin-American countries banking data (e.g.
Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1997, 1999), which try to explore speciﬁc banking sec-
4tor indicators (CAMELS1 framework) that can serve as valuable early warning
signs of banking distress. The particular value of these studies lies in recog-
nition of these factors, which can be addressed by appropriate banking regu-
lation and adequate supervision. The degree of fragility of individual banks is
closely linked to the overall propensity to banking crisis (also due to contagion
effects), in which the bank-speciﬁc factors play important role in systemic sta-
bility.
3. Speciﬁcation of the Model
We follow the normal framework of assuming that bank distress or "crisis",
d, depends upon three groups of variables:
• macroeconomic conditions, m
• the ﬁnancial structure of the economy, s, and
• factors related to the condition of individual banks, b
Thus,
d = f(m,s,b).
3.1. Deﬁnition of Banking Crisis or Bank Distress
There is a considerable debate over how best to measure banking distress or
fragility and over how to deﬁne a crisis. In order to make our work compara-
ble we employ well-known indicators that can be applied to the data available
on individual banks in the CEECs during the period since 1996. Studies of
early warning systems that rely on macro-level data reliant papers (such as
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 1999; and Hutchinson and McDill,
1999) are mainly based upon the Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Lindgren,
Garcia and Saal (1996) datasets of systemic and borderline banking crises.
Given conceptual ambiguity and data limitations the criteria they use for deﬁn-
ing a crisis employ a combination of events, such as, forced closure, merger
or government intervention in the operations of ﬁnancial institutions, runs on
banks, or the extension of large-scale government assistance. However, nei-
ther Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) nor Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996) deﬁne
1CAMELS – Capital Assets Management Earnings Liquidity Sensitivity to market risk.
5incidences of systemic banking crises explicitly for the CEECs, which means
we have to rely on our own estimates to separate crisis from non-crisis periods.
The choice of indicators for crises and problem banks normally covers
measures of nonperforming assets, problem loans and solvency2. Nonper-
forming loans have often been used as the crisis threshold, because they are
the best indicator of near term failure (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999). There is
no one generally accepted measure of the existence of "problems", so we have
to be somewhat pragmatic in our choice. Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu
and Billings (1997) deﬁne fragile banks as those with nonperforming loans of
more than 6–8 percent of total loans. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a)
deﬁne a crisis period inter alia as one in which the nonperforming loans of the
banking system are more than 10% of total assets. Rojas-Suarez (1998) clas-
sify as "crisis" banks whose nonperforming loans to total loans are greater
than the average for the system as whole during "tranquil" periods plus two
standard deviations.
Since we have bank-speciﬁc data, it makes more sense to focus on mea-
sures we can obtain directly. There rather than conditioning on institutional
measuressuchastheexistenceofgovernmentsupport, recapitalisationorother
such interventions, we apply a modiﬁed version of the Gonzalez-Hermosillo
(1999) coverage ratio, which is the ratio of capital equity and loan reserves mi-
nus nonperforming loans to total assets. The advantage of the coverage ratio
is that it takes into account reserves and equity capital, which could cover the
amount of the problem loans.3 Instead of total assets we use the larger of net
loan provisions or impaired loans as the denominator. In order to account for
bank capital cushion and the potential losses from nonperforming loans, the
crisis for a bank is deﬁned as a situation where the ratio of equity and loan re-
serves surplus is less than the higher of net loan provisions or impaired loans.
We label this as a "distressed" bank. Banks with negative or zero equity are
labelled as "insolvent"4.
2The explicit criteria, which have been used in the literature are the following: (1) NPL
to total banking sector assets above 10% or ratio of NPL to total assets greater than 2% of
GDP; (2) The cost of rescue operation at least 2% of GDP; (3) Large scale nationalization;
(4) Extensive bank runs; (5) Emergency measures applied such as deposit freezes, prolonged
bank holidays, deposit guarantees.
3 Depending on the scope of nonperforming loans deﬁnition Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999)
applies a coverage ratio threshold of zero for US banks and a threshold of 1,5 for Mexican and
Colombian banks.
4 For banks whose data on impaired loans are not available, but the net loan provisions
are negative, given the positive equity, are considered as prudent. The maximum of impaired
loans ratio or provisions ratio is used in order to employ more observations and alleviate the
problem of incomparability in provisions deﬁnitions across sample countries.
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where
• Eq – equity,
• LR – loan reserves,
• NLP – net loan provision and
• IL – impaired loans.
Our deﬁnitionof "problem" banksthus encompasses theinstitutions, which
are insolvent and institutions, which are at increased risk due to high actual or
potential loan losses eroding the capital. The latter category of banks might be
called distressed, because, while their own funds cover the loan losses in the
current period, they would not withstand the same magnitude of losses next
period, holding the equity level constant.
This gives us a three-way categorisation: sound, distressed and insolvent
banks. Appendix 2 sets out the data by year and country for all of the banks
in our sample. If any bank is in the distressed or insolvent category then we
label this as a "crisis" period, although this over-dramatises the situation as the
bank is not necessarily of systemic or signiﬁcant proportions. However, small
banks are excluded from our sample as discussed below.
3.2. Early Warning Indicators
The choice of early warning indicators of impending crises that can be
used in the analysis is heavily constrained by the data available. The wider
the sample of countries, the narrower will be the choice. As set out in Table
1, indicators of the probability of failure for an individual bank can be divided
into those that are bank-speciﬁc, those that characterize the banking sector
through externalities or contagion factors, and macroeconomic factors that af-
fect all banks. The latter two normally apply equally to all banks, although
their exposures differ.
Overall there is no universal set of indicators used across previous studies,
although there is more communality over broad-based macro-variables, such
as GDP, exchange rate and inﬂation indexes, which have better cross-country
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(1982-87)  n.a  +***  n.a  n.a  n.a 
 
Notes: Bank deposit ratio: proxy for interest sensitive funding. Note also that in different studies the dependent variable is deﬁned as follows: (1) Berg and
Hexeberg, 1994: Problem bank is considered as a bank seeking assistance from an insurance fund; (2) Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu and Billings,
1997: Bank Failure is considered as an occurrence of bank intervention in form of ﬁnancial assistance, recapitalization etc.; (3) Gonzalez-Hermosillo,
1999: Bank Failure is considered as the incidence of intervention; Distress-Coverage ratio i.e ratio of capital equity and loan reserves minus
nonperforming loans to total assets; (4) Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 1999; Hutschinson and Mc-Dill, 1999: Deﬁnition of (systemic) ﬁnancial
crisis based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) and Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996). For an episode to be classiﬁed as crisis at least one of following
conditions must apply: (a) NPL to total banking sector assets above 10%, (b) Ratio of NPL to total assets greater than 2% of GDP, (c) The cost of rescue
operation at least 2% of GDP, (d) Large scale nationalization, (e) Extensive bank runs, (f) Emergency measures applied such as deposit freezes, prolonged
bank holidays, deposit guarantees, (g) * - statistical signiﬁcance at 10%, ** - statistical signiﬁcance at 5%, *** - statistical signiﬁcance at 1%. Exp -
expected sign.
8comparability and availability. By contrast the set of bank-speciﬁc variables
varies a great deal across the studies available on a cross-country basis. Even
ostensibly similar bank-speciﬁc variables may not be very comparable across
countries, as the accounting regulations and supervisory rules can account for
large variations.
The basis for comparison of bank-speciﬁc variables used in Table 1 is fairly
limited and relies mostly on US, Mexican and Columbian data.5 However






• Interest + fee income/assets.
All of these are conventional measures of bank strength.
The papers dealing with US and Latin-American banks, despite regional
proximity, do not always have consistent results for the same indicators. In
general the liquid assets ratio is expected to reduce the probability of bank
distress, however the result for Californian banks indicates the opposite and
for Mexico and Columbia the coefﬁcients, although with the intuitively cor-
rect sign, turned to be statistically insigniﬁcant. The same applies to bank
deposits to assets ratio and lending indicators, which have opposite and even
statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcients as for different bank samples. Still, ex-
tensive lending in the form of higher loan-to-assets ratio or loan growth ratio
seem to be more predominantly a trigger of a crisis with only exception for US
Southwest. The most convincing result appears as for capital-asset ratio be-
ing consistent across different samples and studies. However, taken together,
the degree of heterogeneity is not a good omen for using this approach on the
CEECs.
The results for macroeconomic indicators are in better conformity, more-
over the studies under consideration incorporate large cross-country samples
all over the world. However, we can see that the results vary also here, as
some studies come up with conﬂicting evidence. According to most studies
5This meta-analysis summary table is far from a complete survey and should be rather
cosidered as an illustration, not a conclusive statement of the similarities and differences
across present literature.
9ﬁnancial deepening seems to increase vulnerability to crises, but there are ex-
ceptions, which conﬂict with this statement. It is not immediately apparent
what result we should expect. Financial deepening is a sign of economic ma-
turity, so a negative sign would be plausible. The same ambiguity applies to
currency depreciation as a possible precipitator of ﬁnancial and banking cri-
sis. Here, the ambivalent results might stem from cross-country differences in
monetary policy (inﬂation targeting versus exchange rate targeting), country
comparative competitive advantages, the level of ﬁnancial deepening or gen-
eral stability and maturity of the economic environment. Fortunately, given
the aim of our study, the largest weight is carried by bank-speciﬁc variables,
which can serve as valuable predictors of emerging vulnerabilities. Hence,
the main source for crisis indicators is the balance sheet and income statement
information. The bank-speciﬁc view is complemented by several indicators
reﬂecting the macroeconomic environment and structural developments.
One critical issue is the time-effect of signalling variables, whereas this
plays a major role when considering the high likelihood of endogenous feed-
back. Duetolikelyendogeneitythewarningvariablesmightbehavecontrover-
sially depending on the time lag before the incidence of distress and perhaps
GMM or some other means of coping with simultaneity will be required.
4. Empirical Study
4.1. Data
Much of the novelty of the present paper is attributable to the underly-
ing data. The study uses macroeconomic and microeconomic variables drawn
from Bankscope, IFS and Eurostat for 21 CEE countries including all new EU
member states and candidate countries and several republics of former Soviet
Union including Russia over the years 1996–2003. The full list is shown in
Table 2.
Due to missing entries the initial sample of 684 banks and 2,787 observa-
tions was reduced to about 900 observations and 300 banks from 17 countries
in the econometric analysis.6 The following descriptive analysis, except for
the table for average values of early warning indicators7, however employs all
data for which the bank status could be identiﬁed or 2,787 observations.
Table 3 shows the crisis episodes for the full data set, indicating that 1999
6The panel drop-out properties did not justify the weighting of remaining panel members.
7 For better comparability with logit analysis the average county values of early warning
variables include only these more than 300 banks included in the econometric model.
10Table 2: Countries included
Albania,   Belarus,  
Bulgaria,   Bosnia-Herzegovina,  
Croatia,   Czech Republic,  
Cyprus,   Estonia,  
Hungary,   Latvia,  
Lithuania,   FYR Macedonia,  
Malta,   Moldova,  
Poland,   Romania,  
Russian Federation,   Slovakia,  
Slovenia,   Turkey,  
Ukraine.    
 
was the year of greatest banking problems – 40 occurrences (14 insolvent,
26 distressed) in 15 different countries. Weighted by the severity of bank-
ing problems (insolvency or distress), the countries, which faced the largest
number of bank stress incidences over the period 1996–2003, were Poland,
Croatia, Turkey, Russia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The systemic im-
pact of bank distress, as measured by the number of problem banks from the
whole sector and the share of assets from the banking sector total, indicates
that broadly the same countries, except Russia, were the most affected. How-
ever, Malta and Cyprus also indicated a relatively high level of stress from a
systemic perspective.
The mean values of warning variables for sound and problem banks in
all sample countries are shown in Appendix 3. Despite the fast restructuring
process leading to high diversity as for economic and political achievements
across CEE countries, there are no remarkable differences in bank-speciﬁc
variables between the new EU members and the rest of CEE countries (see
Figure 1). The only statistically signiﬁcant exception is the loan-to-assets ra-
tio, which was higher for problem-banks in EU countries but lower for un-
sound banks in the non-EU sample. This is probably a feature of the immature
lending markets, where banks with a larger lending portfolio exhibit a greater
resemblance to banks in developed economies and are thus also more market-
oriented.
In contrast to bank-speciﬁc variables there is more diversity in the macro-
economic variables between the EU and non-EU sub-samples. While higher
concentration is indicated by the Herﬁndahl index for problem banks in non-
EU sample, the opposite of low banking market concentration is coupled with
bankingproblemsinEUsamplecountries. AhighHerﬁndahlindexinthenon-
EU sample also corresponds to a high share of public owned banks. This in-
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Figure 1: Bank-speciﬁc variables of sound and unsound banks in EU-10 and
non-EU CEEC.
12oriented is the banking environment. Where a CEEC belongs to the EU group,
strongmarketcompetitiontriggersbankfailures. Weakmonetarypolicyseems
to be more of an issue for non-EU countries’ banking stability. Both the cur-
rency shock (sharp depreciation) and high inﬂationary pressures tend to be
more important triggers of banking problems.
In general, the average indicator levels for sound and problem banks across
countries vary a great deal, so no universal threshold level can be found, which
adequately signals the vulnerabilities over the whole sample of countries. This
might also be taken as one further argument in favour of using differences
instead of levels for the explanatory variables in the logit model described in
the next section.
The sample countries can also be compared according to the EBRD bank-
ing sector reform index (see Figure 2). Unfortunately no observations are
available for Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. In general the new EU members
demonstrate better advancement in banking reforms than other participants in
the study. The exceptions are Croatia and Bulgaria, which belong to the front-























































































Figure 2: EBRD banking sector reform index, average 1998–2004.
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2004.
Another interesting insight into the pattern of bank problems in different
sample countries can be found from the bank transition matrix (see Table 3).
13Table 3: Bank transition matrix 1996–2003
in percentages
sound problem sound problem sound problem sound problem
sound 100 0 94 6 100 0 94 6
problem 50 50 88 13 78 22 24 76
all 97 3 93 7 98 2 87 13
sound problem sound problem sound problem sound problem
sound 95 5 87 13 85 15 94 6
problem 56 44 44 56 100 0 86 14
all 88 12 79 21 87 13 93 7
sound problem sound problem sound problem sound problem
sound 98 2 88 12 98 2 88 12
problem 67 33 0 100 100 0 20 80
all 96 4 70 30 98 2 72 28
sound problem sound problem sound problem sound problem
sound 97 3 100 0 97 3 98 2
problem 75 25 67 33 44 56 50 50
all 95 5 99 1 88 12 97 3
sound problem sound problem
sound 99 1 96 4
problem 100 0 45 55
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In the whole sample of 21 countries the historical probability of a sound bank
remaining in a prudent state was about 96% against the probability of 4%
falling into difﬁculties and become unsound. About a half of the problem
banks8 eventually recovered, whereas the rest remained unsound over the next
year.
The highest chance (15%) of a sound bank becoming a problem bank was
found in Estonia. However, none of the problem banks remained unsound over
the next period, they either closed down or improved. This might imply some
differences in the way in which the market operated, as Estonia only had dis-
tressed, butnotinsolventbanksinthesampleperiod. Theprobabilityoffalling
into problem bank status was also relatively high in Cyprus, Malta and Poland.
The transition matrix also demonstrates the persistence of bank problems. The
8The transition matrix cannot take into account those banks, which disappeared from the
database.
14highest likelihood for an unsound bank retaining its vulnerable status was in
Malta, where none of the banks recovered once they had fallen into the prob-
lem category. This, however, has to be interpreted given the small number of
banks in Malta and the fact that none of the problem banks was badly insol-
vent. The bank problems indicated a high persistence also for Poland, Croatia,
Cyprus and Slovakia.9
4.2. Model Speciﬁcation
We use the binomial ﬁxed effects panel logit model to explore the relation-
ship, which can be expressed by the following general speciﬁcation:
E (yijt|x,β,α) = β
0xijt + cj
The dependent variable y denotes the bank status and is equal to 0 or 1 for
sound and problem banks respectively. x is a set of early warning indicators
having indexes i = 1,...N;j = 1,...K; t = 1,..T, where N≈300 banks in
the panel; K = 17 number of countries in the panel; T = 8 number of years
(1996-2003).
In theory we have a choice of models of discrete dependent variables,
largely between logit and probit, which are the most commonly used in em-
pirical research on ﬁnancial crisis and early warning systems. The important
distinction from our point of view is that the probit model is based on the
normal distribution, whereas logit model applies the logistic distribution. The
logistic distribution has fat tails compared to the normal distribution and there-
fore tends to be more appropriate for model ﬁnancial data, which are often
leptokurtic. Furthermore, Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu and Billings
(1997) claim in testing for several functional forms, including Weibull, normal
and exponential distributions, that the logistic distribution best matches with
the features of banking crisis data in Mexico. Similarly, they refer to earlier
studies, which found that the logistic distribution best describes the banking
difﬁculties in the United States for the period 1985–1992. However in large
samples the two models should give broadly similar results.
9 The caveat here is that transition matrix is sensitive to the choice of sample period,
wherefore for these countries, which suffered more banking sector problems at the beginning
of the observation period have lower probability of a sound bank to become problem bank and
higher likelihood of problem banks to recover. The availability and goodness of data also play
a great role as the banks with missing data drop out of the matrix.
15Another issue, which favours the logit speciﬁcation, is the fact that the pro-
bit model does not lend itself well to the ﬁxed effect treatment, as there is
no feasible way to remove the heterogeneity and with large number of cross-
sectional units as in the current study the estimation of ﬁxed effects is in-
tractable (Green, 1995). In contrast to the probit model, the logit model en-
ables treatment of ﬁxed effects. The ﬁxed effect treatment in current study is
needed for extracting country-speciﬁc time-constant features.
Themaximizationofaconditionallikelihoodfunction(Chamberlain, 1980)
requires sufﬁcient statistics for the group-speciﬁc parameters. Therefore only
these groups (countries) enter the estimation, which have both the crisis and
tranquil observations available over the sample period.
The partial effects from ﬁxed effects logit estimates are not straightfor-
ward. The logit coefﬁcients on explanatory variables give the log-odds ratio
i.e. log{Λ(xtβ + c)/1 − Λ(xtβ + c)} = xtβ + c. Hence the partial effects
on the response probabilities cannot be estimated without knowing c, which
distribution is unrestricted and thus hard to know (Wooldridge, 2000).
In order to test how well the logit model ﬁts the data it is simplest to look
at maximum likelihood measure. Intuitively better measure of model explana-
tory power is the likelihood ratio index (LRI), whose value is bounded by 0
and 1. The closer LRI is to 1, the better the goodness of ﬁt. In the ﬁrst model
with predominantly ﬁrst differences gives for LRI 0.71 and the model based on
second differences has LRI value of 0.696. These are relatively good results.
Thus,
LRI = 1 −
lnLur
lnLo
0 < LRI < 1
where restricted log-likelihood is:
lnLo = n[P lnP + (1 − P)ln(1 − P)]
Thekeyconsiderationinchoosingbetweenarandomeffects(RE)andﬁxed
effects (FE) approach is whether ci and xit are correlated. Hausman (1978)
proposed a test based on the difference between random effects and ﬁxed ef-
fect estimates. Since FE is consistent when ci and xitare correlated, but RE
is inconsistent, a statistically signiﬁcant difference is interpreted as evidence
against the random effects assumption. However, Hausman test needs strict
16exogeneity, whereas correlation between xis and uit for any s and t causes
both FE and RE to be inconsistent.
Applying the Hausman test, however, did not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
difference between random effects and ﬁxed effect speciﬁcation of the model.
Nevertheless, the theoretical arguments and maximum likelihood measures in-
dicate that the ﬁxed effects model seems to be a more appropriate speciﬁcation
given the aim of the study.
Bank-speciﬁc variables from ﬁnancial statements are closely interlinked,
which causes estimation problems from high collinearity if several are in-
cluded. To cope with the problem two methods were applied. First the factor
loadings were calculated and employed in order to ﬁlter out the dominating
variables of similar nature, e.g. the most representative efﬁciency variable
from different proxy-measures. Secondly, since it is not immediately apparent
what the appropriate metric is, the inverse values of the variables were used
instead of original ratios.
To overcome problems of endogeneity in using bank-speciﬁc variables, be-
cause the ﬁnancial variables from banks accounts might be itself a reﬂection
of crisis, the explanatory variables are modelled in differences and not in lev-
els. Statistically signiﬁcant explanatory variables (in difference form) were in
turn tested for exogeneity. For this purpose the simple procedure described by
Wooldridge (2000) was carried through10. As a result the contemporaneous
values of differences of loan-asset ratio, equity investments ratio and cost-
income ratio turned to be not exogeneous. Hence, for these variables only the
lagged difference values can be used in order to avoid misleading results due
to endogeneity.
5. Results
The results from the ﬁxed effects panel logit model (see Table 4) indicate
that macroeconomic variables tend to give a signal earlier than most of ﬁ-
nancial variables. This might be because the year lags are too long for many
volatile bank-speciﬁc indicators. The Wald test, however, strongly rejects the
hypothesis that either the bank-speciﬁc variables or macroeconomic variables
are irrelevant for explaining the crisis probability.11
10In the ﬁrst step the explanatory variable of interest is regressed against the rest of ex-
planatory variables. In the second step the residuals from the OLS are substituted into the
logit estimation. If the t-statistic of residual turns to be statistically signiﬁcant the variable of
interest is not exogenous.
11 For bank-speciﬁc variables the χ2 ( 10) = 36.16 and Prob > χ2 = 0.0001. For macro-
economic variables the χ2(6) = 18.30 Prob > χ2 = 0.0055.
17Variables in all categories of bank conditions offer some degree of explana-
tion of ensuing crisis although the market risk is the weakest. Problem loans,
not surprisingly, stand out as the clearest indicator of subsequent distress. The
only other bank characteristic that offers some clear explanation looking two
years ahead (see column 2) is the cost-income ratio, demonstrating that inefﬁ-
ciencies can have detrimental effect on bank soundness.
With only a one year horizon (see column 1) several variables act as indi-
cators. The solvency ratio indicates a clear path, being negative throughout
the period leading to distress. However, in a sense solvency indicators are
not so much early warning signs, as actual results of bank’s long-term mis-
management. However, Sundararajan et al. (2002) have claimed that banks
with higher equity need to borrow less to support a given level of assets and
thus have lower interest expenses, which results in higher net interest and net
income.
The liquidity measures tend to have intuitively correct signs. The inverse
liquidity ratio is positively correlated with banking problems in both the fol-
lowing year and two-years ahead models. Interest expenses on funding in-
crease immediately before crisis, while they have been decreasing further
ahead of the crash. The inverse moral hazard indicator shows that vulnerable
banks have low proﬁtability in the pre-crisis year. The loan-assets ratio does
not indicate any clear pattern, although it tends to be lower in the pre-crisis
year, which is rather counter-intuitive.
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Log likelihood -203.19 -232.74









Notes: (1) z-values in brackets. Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary were
dropped due to no crisis observations in model sample. (2) d indicates ﬁrst difference,
L one lag and, L2 two lags. (3) *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1%
levels respectively.
19The interpretation of market risk indicators is more ambiguous, as it was
the only risk component, which turned out to be also jointly insigniﬁcant.
Therefore no conclusions can be drawn based on coefﬁcient on equity invest-
ments ratio or trade income ratio.
Our two bank structure indicators offer some support to traditional hy-
potheses. The negative sign for the Herﬁndahl index, although the coefﬁcient
is insigniﬁcant, suggests that high competition might lead to more frequent
occurrences of bank failure. The behaviour of the ﬁnancial deepening mea-
sure, proxied by private lending to GDP, is also intuitive. A crisis is correlated
with ﬁnancial deepening ex ante and ﬁnancial contraction at the time of the
crisis. The share of state-owned banks indicates that privatisation or a higher
proportion of private banks has been accompanied with crisis episodes in the
transition countries. However, it appears that this positive correlation of pri-
vate banks with distress incidences falls primarily in the non-EU group of CEE
countries (see Appendices 1 and 2).
The macroeconomic variables point in the expected directions, although
mainly further ahead rather than in the current period. Declining GDP growth
and instabilities in the external and domestic environment lead to higher like-
lihood of crises. Rises in Euribor-3M interest rates raises the costs of funding,
which precipitates ﬁnancial problems for many CEE countries. Pre-crisis in-
ﬂationary pressures and the eventual drop also belong to a story of crisis. Cur-
rency depreciation seems to trigger banking problems, but the sign is reversed
in the current period. Depreciation on its own puts pressure on both banks’
balance sheets and those of their borrowers if loans have been taken out in
foreign currency. There is a delay before payments are due and this bites. This
might indicate loose monetary control in the preceding period and restrictive
monetary policy ex post, which leads to eventual stress in the banking sector.
Given the individual statistical insigniﬁcance of many predictive variables
and unobserved effects characteristic of the logit model, which does not allow
for good interpretation of partial effects, we need to explore the patterns of
the proposed early warning indicators in explaining bank distress further. A
simple ﬁrst step is to look at the model’s predictive power. Table 5 summarises
the in-sample predictive properties of the model estimates. Missing observa-
tions the estimated model means we have 121 crisis observations from 17 CEE
countries. The in-samplepredictivepowerofthe modelseemsencouraging. In
seven countries the in-sample prediction of crises was perfect, although it cou-
pled with a somewhat higher degree of noise. The model worked best in case
of Latvia, Moldova, Russia and Lithuania. The only countries where the esti-
mates did not recognize any crisis were Slovenia and Ukraine. The in-sample
predictive performance in picking up the crisis episodes was also relatively
weak for Poland, Turkey and Croatia. The in-sample estimation revealed that
20the model overpredicts problems for Estonia and Malta, whereas it was insuf-
ﬁciently sensitive in capturing banking problems in Poland, Croatia, Slovakia
and Turkey. The model’s poor performance for Poland might be largely due to
a stringent national deﬁnition of sub-standard loans, i.e. loans overdue 30 days
instead of the common international and EU deﬁnition of overdue 90 days.12
Therefore the threshold for deﬁning bank distress for Poland is too low.
















Bosnia-Herzegovina 97% 9% 33% 3% 0% 0%
Croatia 80% 24% 84% 20% 0% 0%
Czech Republic 83% 8% 33% 3% 16% 15%
Cyprus 86% 23% 0% 0% 18% 14%
Estonia 62% 14% 0% 0% 44% 38%
Latvia 98% 5% 0% 0% 2% 2%
Lithuania 92% 3% 0% 0% 8% 8%
FYR Macedonia 93% 7% 0% 0% 7% 7%
Malta 75% 50% 13% 6% 38% 19%
Moldova 91% 4% 0% 0% 9% 9%
Poland 64% 39% 94% 36% 0% 0%
Romania 94% 6% 50% 3% 3% 3%
Russian Federation 98% 1% 0% 0% 2% 2%
Slovakia 85% 12% 60% 7% 8% 7%
Slovenia 96% 4% 100% 4% 0% 0%
Turkey 86% 16% 86% 14% 0% 0%
Ukraine 95% 2% 100% 2% 4% 4%
Total 87% 13% 69% 9% 5% 4%
In-sample crisis probability
The second step was to run an out-of-sample and see how well the model
manages to recognize the crises of 2003 based on the estimates from the years
1996–2002. There were 21 crisis episodes out of 186 observations in 2003.
These were concentrated in six countries: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta,
Poland and Slovenia.
As shown in Table 6 the model managed to recognize banking problems
in two out of the six countries, Cyprus and Estonia,13 but it also extracted a
high degree of noise. The model failed to pick up any of the crises in Poland,
Slovenia, Malta and Croatia. This is a similar result to the in-sample predic-
tion, which also highlighted the model sensitivity for Estonia and Cyprus, and
12 The deﬁnition of substandard loans was brought in line with EU standards in January
2004.
13 The model recognised 3 episodes of bank distress out of 21. Two incidences were picked
up as for Cyprus and one incidence for Estonia.
21its weakness in identifying problems predominantly in Poland, Slovenia and
Croatia. For the 11 countries, which did not experience banking problems in
2003, the wrong signal was extracted only once for Russia (type-II error 3%)
and three times for Romania (type-II error 33%). In general the results tend to
be weaker for banking sectors in highly regulated markets.
Table 6: Model out-of-sample predictive power
















Croatia 76% 24% 100% 24% 0% 0%
Cyprus 75% 50% 0% 0% 50% 25%
Estonia 75% 25% 0% 0% 100% 75%
Malta 48% 48% 100% 48% 0% 0%
Poland 48% 48% 100% 48% 8% 4%
Slovenia 92% 8% 100% 8% 0% 0%
Total 76% 11% 86% 10% 16% 14%
Given the limitations of descriptive statistics and the logit model the re-
search could be further elaborated by employing duration models or con-
ducting bank survival analysis. Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1997, 1999) has suc-
cessfully employed the logit technique and survival models in parallel. As
claimed by Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998), the formerly socialist transition
economies suffered a special range of problems that make them noncompara-
ble with most of the other countries. The source for these noncomparabilities
is mainly related to institutional factors, such as privatisation and liberalisa-
tion, enactment of new banking regulations and reforms in the monetary sys-
tem. Therefore, further analysis of banking vulnerabilities could incorporate a
wider range of indicators reﬂecting the major institutional changes during the
transition process and a broader background for the differences in the devel-
opment of the banking sector across the sample countries.
6. Conclusions
Using panel data at the bank level, it is possible to ﬁnd bank-speciﬁc, bank
sector structure and macro-economic variables that are able to predict vul-
nerabilities in the CEE countries’ banking sector over the period since 1996.
Macro-economic variables tend to perform better in predicting a couple of
years ahead, as they are more persistent compared to the more volatile ﬁnan-
22cial variables. However, the ﬁnancial variables have more to say about the
crisis pattern, explaining how both the causes and the reactions contribute to
a crisis or its avoidance. Not surprisingly the indicators are inter-related and
while individual factors may be weakly determined their joint effect is clear.
There are some interesting differences between the ten new EU members
and the rest of the observed CEE countries. Although these two groups had
broadly similar patterns of differences between the sound and problem banks,
the high loan-to-assets ratio in the EU sample was associated with problem
banks, whereas the same was characteristic of sound banks in the non-EU
sub-sample. Similarly, although not statistically signiﬁcant, the higher trade-
income ratio was a feature of distressed banks in the EU group, while being
rather the indicator of prudent institutions for the non-EU group. With the
macroeconomic variables, the non-EU banks turned out to be more vulnerable
to inﬂationary pressures and exchange rate movements.
The in-sample and out-of-sample predictions with the model had relatively
encouraging results. It managed to predict all distress episodes in seven coun-
tries out of the seventeen studied in detail. Out-of-sample prediction as for the
year 2003 revealed that the model was able to capture the bank-distress inci-
dences in two countries out of six. In the remaining countries the number of
incidences are either over- or under-estimated. The estimates tend to be over-
sensitive for Estonia and Cyprus, in which cases all the distress episodes were
identiﬁed but further problems were suggested that did not actually occur. On
the other hand, the occurrence of unsound banks in Poland, Croatia, Turkey,
Malta and Slovenia was underestimated.
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25Appendix 1. Crisis episodes by number of banks and proportional to banks’ number and banking sector’s total assets
year Albania Belarus Bosnia-Herz Bulgaria Croatia Czech Rep Cyprus Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania
# crisis n.a. 0 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 1 2
% banks n.a. 0% 0% 38% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0% 7% 40%
% total assets n.a. 0% 0% 34% 0% 28% 0% 0% 0% 0% 21%
# crisis 0 1 2 4 1 5 1 1 1 2 1
% banks 0% 50% 33% 27% 3% 26% 20% 13% 9% 12% 14%
% total assets 0% 96% 39% 20% 5% 68% 3% 3% 0% 9% 3%
# crisis 0 1 0 0 3 4 1 1 0 2 0
% banks 0% 25% 0% 0% 9% 24% 17% 25% 0% 13% 0%
% total assets 0% 95% 0% 0% 6% 45% 3% 1% 0% 42% 0%
# crisis 2 0 3 1 3 2 1 0 0 2 0
% banks 40% 0% 20% 5% 9% 12% 14% 0% 0% 13% 0%
% total assets 86% 0% 13% 6% 11% 28% 3% 0% 0% 11% 0%
# crisis 0 0 1 1 7 1 1 1 0 1 1
% banks 0% 0% 6% 5% 19% 6% 13% 20% 0% 6% 11%
% total assets 0% 0% 3% 6% 11% 1% 0% 1% 0% 3% 27%
# crisis 0 0 2 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
% banks 0% 0% 13% 0% 15% 7% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%
% total assets 0% 0% 11% 0% 8% 1% 0% 19% 0% 0% 0%
# crisis 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 0
% banks 0% 0% 0% 0% 16% 7% 42% 0% 0% 0% 0%
% total assets 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 1% 87% 0% 0% 0% 0%
# crisis 0 0 0 0 6 0 3 1 0 0 0
% banks 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 30% 17% 0% 0% 0%
% total assets 0% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 29% 5% 0% 0% 0%
year crisis Macedonia Malta Moldova Poland Romania Russian Fed Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Ukraine
# crisis 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 0 0
% banks 0% 0% 0% 7% 50% 3% 15% 0% 0% 0%
% total assets 0% 0% 0% 0% 23% 0% 69% 0% 0% 0%
# crisis 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 1 0
% banks 0% 0% 0% 9% 0% 0% 18% 0% 8% 0%
% total assets 0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 0% 70% 0% 8% 0%
# crisis 0 0 1 4 0 2 5 1 1 2
% banks 0% 0% 17% 12% 0% 7% 33% 6% 7% 12%
% total assets 0% 0% 24% 31% 0% 16% 68% 5% 5% 27%
# crisis 2 1 0 8 2 6 3 0 4 0
% banks 22% 20% 0% 22% 18% 10% 25% 0% 13% 0%
% total assets 48% 40% 0% 62% 0% 8% 15% 0% 31% 0%
# crisis 0 1 0 11 3 3 2 0 1 0
% banks 0% 20% 0% 30% 18% 3% 14% 0% 4% 0%
% total assets 0% 38% 0% 77% 0% 1% 9% 0% 0% 0%
# crisis 0 2 0 12 0 0 1 0 8 1
% banks 0% 33% 0% 32% 0% 0% 6% 0% 33% 3%
% total assets 0% 80% 0% 82% 0% 0% 3% 0% 29% 1%
# crisis 1 3 0 14 1 1 0 1 5 1
% banks 9% 60% 0% 42% 6% 1% 0% 8% 20% 3%
% total assets 3% 83% 0% 88% 0% 0% 0% 8% 13% 2%
# crisis 0 3 0 12 0 0 0 1 2 0
% banks 0% 50% 0% 39% 0% 0% 0% 7% 8% 0%

























































3Appendix 2. Crisis episodes 1996–2003 grouped by countries
year crisis Albania Belarus Bosnia-Herz Bulgaria Croatia Czech Rep Cyprus Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania
sound n.a. 2 2 5 30 15 4 7 8 14 3
distress n.a. 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 1 0
insolvent n.a. 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2
sound 2 1 4 11 36 14 4 7 10 15 6
distress 0 1 2 4 1 5 1 1 1 2 1
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 1 3 12 19 30 13 5 3 8 13 8
distress 0 0 0 0 3 4 1 1 0 1 0
insolvent 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
sound 3 6 12 18 30 15 6 4 12 13 7
distress 0 0 3 1 2 2 1 0 0 2 0
insolvent 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 5 6 15 20 29 15 7 4 14 17 8
distress 0 0 1 1 7 1 1 1 0 1 1
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 4 10 13 21 29 14 10 3 11 13 9
distress 0 0 1 0 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
insolvent 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 5 10 16 24 26 14 7 4 12 16 9
distress 0 0 0 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 0
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 3 6 12 22 30 14 7 5 9 19 9
distress 0 0 0 0 6 0 3 1 0 0 0
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 23 44 86 140 240 114 50 37 84 120 59
distress 0 1 7 8 29 17 12 5 1 7 2
insolvent 2 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 2
25 46 94 149 270 133 62 42 85 128 63
year crisis Macedonia Malta Moldova Poland Romania Russian Fed Slovakia Slovenia Turkey Ukraine Total
sound 6 4 6 28 1 36 11 16 10 6 214
distress 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 11
insolvent 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
sound 6 5 6 32 5 39 14 22 12 11 262
distress 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 23
insolvent 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 3
sound 4 6 5 29 8 25 10 15 14 15 246
distress 0 0 1 3 0 0 3 1 0 2 20
insolvent 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 0 1 0 8
sound 7 4 9 28 9 56 9 17 27 25 317
distress 2 1 0 6 1 1 2 0 2 0 26
insolvent 0 0 0 2 1 5 1 0 2 0 14
sound 9 4 9 26 14 95 12 17 25 25 376
distress 0 1 0 11 2 0 1 0 0 0 29
insolvent 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 1 0 6
sound 10 4 10 26 16 114 15 15 16 30 393
distress 0 2 0 12 0 0 1 0 7 0 30
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3
sound 10 2 10 19 17 118 14 12 20 29 394
distress 1 3 0 14 1 1 0 1 5 0 37
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
sound 11 3 6 19 16 76 14 13 24 22 340
distress 0 3 0 12 0 0 0 1 2 0 28
insolvent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
sound 63 32 61 207 86 559 99 127 148 163 2542
distress 3 10 1 61 5 3 11 3 16 2 204
insolvent 0 0 0 5 2 10 5 0 6 2 41



















1999Appendix 3. Mean level of warning indicators for sound (0) and unsound (1) banks in country comparison
crisis Czech Rep Cyprus Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia EU Albania Belarus Bosnia-Herz Bulgaria Croatia Macedonia Moldova Romania Russia Turkey Ukraine non_EU Total
0 61% 39% 35% 44% 52% 44% 56% 50% 55% 37% 47% 102% 33% 64% 66% 58% 58% 51% 60% 47% 60% 51% 55% 52%
1 40% 31% 36% - 56% 53% 29% 48% 36% 50% 44% - - 44% - 51% 26% 33% 49% 68% 52% 33% 49% 46%
all 61% 36% 35% 44% 53% 45% 41% 49% 53% 38% 47% 102% 33% 63% 66% 57% 58% 52% 59% 47% 58% 51% 54% 64%
0 7% 5% 4% 6% 3% 3% 4% 8% 7% 5% 5% 5% 10% 2% 2% 5% 4% 7% 12% 6% 20% 7% 7% 6%
1 8% 4% 4% - 3% 3% 4% 7% 10% 5% 6% - - 2% - 5% 5% 14% 11% 9% 20% 8% 8% 7%
all 7% 4% 4% 6% 3% 3% 4% 8% 7% 5% 6% 5% 10% 2% 2% 5% 4% 7% 12% 6% 20% 7% 7% 7%
0 53% 8% 20% 26% 20% 39% 15% 162% 22% 19% 54% 0% 30% 16% 11% 18% 18% 26% 23% 47% 24% 27% 30% 41%
1 22% 3% 13% - 32% 3% 11% 44% 17% 19% 32% - - 4% - 21% 11% 112% 2% 15% 10% 19% 19% 28%
all 50% 7% 19% 26% 21% 38% 13% 116% 21% 19% 50% 0% 30% 15% 11% 19% 17% 30% 22% 47% 21% 26% 29% 39%
0 -9% 4% 6% 4% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 1% 5% 5% 3% 7% 7% 7% 4% -16% 6% 7% -1% 1%
1 27% 18% 12% - 23% 14% 12% 20% 30% 17% 20% - - 28% - 30% 28% 19% 23% 15% 57% 2% 33% 24%
all -6% 7% 7% 400% 4% 5% 7% 10% 7% 5% 6% 1% 5% 7% 3% 13% 9% 8% 5% -16% 15% 6% 2% 4%
0 34% 55% 57% 54% 37% 46% 38% 50% 39% 54% 46% 0% 57% 50% 41% 50% 45% 50% 41% 49% 35% 51% 47% 47%
1 50% 61% 59% - 29% 27% 52% 49% 50% 49% 49% - - 50% - 46% 56% 61% 42% 30% 28% 54% 44% 47%
all 35% 58% 58% 54% 37% 46% 46% 49% 40% 54% 46% 0% 57% 50% 41% 49% 45% 49% 42% 49% 33% 51% 47% 47%
0 0,4% 0,2% 0,5% 0,3% 0,9% 1,3% 0,7% 1,0% 0,3% 2,2% 1,0% - 0,3% 0,7% 0,6% 0,9% 4,9% 1,1% 1,0% 2,2% 2,2% 1,2% 1,6% 1,3%
1 0,6% 0,1% 0,2% - 2,8% 0,4% 0,8% 1,9% 0,5% 0,3% 1,4% - - 0,6% - 2,4% 28,8% 0,2% 0,4% 0,2% 1,2% 0,4% 2,5% 1,8%
all 0,5% 0,2% 0,5% 0,3% 1,0% 1,2% 1,6% 1,3% 0,3% 2,1% 1,2% - 0,3% 0,7% 0,6% 1,3% 5,5% 1,1% 1,0% 2,2% 2,0% 1,1% 1,8% 1,5%
0 156% 160% 160% 141% 76% 249% 57% 223% 312% 105% 168% 3% 352% 1002% 350% 89% 105% 35% 61% 202% 742% 78% 243% 209%
1 48% 22% 156% - 25% 57% 44% 412% 152% 220% 284% - - 177% 196% 309% 26% 43% 47% 89% 155% 166% 243%
all 148% 129% 160% 141% 74% 244% 51% 297% 291% 109% 189% 3% 352% 929% 350% 115% 119% 35% 60% 201% 635% 79% 236% 213%
0 98% 67% 74% 72% 89% 87% 62% 64% 82% 64% 76% 30% 74% 59% 74% 63% 55% 51% 72% 63% 76% 57% 64% 69%
1 62% 91% 71% - 127% 79% 55% 76% 94% 76% 77% - - 92% 112% 38% 50% 60% - 131% 103% 103% 85%
all 95% 71% 74% 72% 90% 87% 56% 69% 84% 64% 76% 30% 74% 63% 74% 75% 55% 53% 71% 63% 80% 57% 66% 71%
0 8% 6% 8% 9% 8% 7% 5% 11% 8% 8% 8% 8% 14% 6% 6% 8% 7% 13% 16% 9% 24% 12% 10% 10%
1 10% 5% 8% - 13% 9% 5% 9% 12% 8% 9% - - 7% - 7% 11% 16% 18% 8% 26% 10% 11% 10%
all 8% 6% 8% 9% 8% 7% 5% 10% 9% 8% 8% 8% 14% 6% 6% 7% 8% 14% 16% 9% 24% 12% 11% 10%
0 7% 8% 10% 9% 9% 13% 8% 13% 10% 11% 10% 2% 14% 14% 18% 15% 25% 24% 19% 19% 11% 18% 17% 14%
1 5% 7% 9% - -10% 7% 7% 9% 0% 8% 7% - - 5% - 8% 11% 18% 11% -4% -22% 0% 3% 6%
all 7% 7% 10% 9% 9% 12% 8% 12% 9% 10% 10% 2% 14% 13% 18% 13% 25% 24% 18% 19% 6% 17% 16% 13%
0 1760 2797 4150 3610 1929 2734 3711 1222 1802 1927 2137 5422 5404 1363 1419 2132 3309 1863 3567 2357 1343 1057 2175 2161
1 1743 2856 4707 4033 2009 2505 3306 1085 1875 2068 1819 5999 9173 1336 2517 2507 2742 2530 3905 2505 1222 1122 2385 2052
all 1758 2809 4217 3615 1934 2719 3614 1189 1812 1931 2094 5468 5568 1361 1485 2174 3284 1874 3592 2361 1328 1058 2187 2151
0 4% 23% 0% 8% 4% 17% 12% 30% 21% 34% 20% 59% 62% 23% 19% 14% 1% 10% 45% 44% 34% 11% 27% 24%
1 4% 4% 0% - 5% 38% 0% 26% 41% 22% 21% - - 30% - 11% 2% 0% 50% 42% 33% 12% 20% 20%
all 4% 19% 0% 8% 4% 17% 6% 28% 23% 33% 20% 59% 62% 23% 19% 13% 1% 9% 45% 44% 33% 11% 27% 23%
0 2% 3% 6% 4% 6% 6% 1% 4% 4% 4% 4% 6% 5% 8% 3% 4% 2% 2% 2% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4%
1 1% 3% 7% 5% 5% 5% -1% 3% 4% 3% 3% 9% 10% 14% -5% 4% 3% -7% 2% 5% 0% 3% 3% 3%
all 2% 3% 6% 4% 6% 6% 1% 4% 4% 4% 4% 6% 6% 9% 3% 4% 2% 2% 2% 5% 3% 4% 4% 4%
0 54% 113% 25% 31% 19% 13% 110% 26% 45% 34% 39% 4% 10% 43% 18% 41% 20% 20% 9% 15% 20% 13% 21% 27%
1 66% 117% 26% 24% 13% 11% 113% 27% 52% 37% 47% 3% 12% 45% 28% 44% 20% 14% 8% 14% 19% 12% 27% 39%
all 55% 113% 25% 30% 18% 13% 111% 26% 46% 34% 40% 4% 10% 44% 18% 41% 20% 19% 9% 15% 20% 13% 21% 28%
0 3% 4% 8% 11% 5% 3% 3% 7% 7% 8% 6% 6% 99% 2% 7% 4% 3% 18% 41% 27% 58% 16% 23% 17%
1 2% 3% 6% 19% 6% 15% 2% 5% 8% 7% 5% 0% 68% 5% 1% 4% 0% 8% 41% 54% 54% 9% 25% 13%
all 2% 4% 8% 11% 5% 4% 3% 7% 7% 8% 6% 5% 98% 2% 6% 4% 2% 18% 41% 28% 57% 16% 23% 17%
0 0,02% 0,01% 0,00% 0,04% -0,01% -0,06% -0,02% 0,04% 0,01% 0,06% 0,02% 0,00% 1,11% -0,02% 0,00% 0,01% -0,01% 0,24% 0,26% 0,13% 0,48% 0,12% 0,14% 0,09%
1 0,03% -0,14% 0,01% - 0,02% 0,00% -0,02% 0,01% 0,09% -0,04% 0,00% - - 0,07% - 0,02% 0,00% 0,16% 0,42% 0,66% 0,74% -0,01% 0,18% 0,07%
all 0,02% -0,03% 0,00% 0,04% -0,01% -0,06% -0,02% 0,03% 0,02% 0,06% 0,01% 0,00% 1,11% -0,01% 0,00% 0,02% 0,00% 0,24% 0,26% 0,13% 0,53% 0,12% 0,14% 0,08%









































 Moral hazard i.e 
interest and fee 
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k Equity investments 
ratio
Trade income ratio
New EU members (444 observations, o/w 79 crisis episodes) Non-EU members (473 observations, o/w 42 crisis episodes)
INDICATORS
Liquid assets to 
short-term funding
Bank deposits to 
customer deposits 
ratio
Problem loans ratio
Loan-to-asset ratio
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